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Security audit, November 2026

An internal audit of the whole repository on 16 November 2026, against release 1.0.0rc2. It is not a substitute for the external review that 1.0 requires (brief).

How it was done

  • Code reading of every security-relevant module: identity, policies, signed state and cursors, approvals, idempotency, handles and jobs, the stores, outbound fetches, HTTP defaults, error and trace redaction, limits, the broker, OAuth, the HTML reports and the command line.
  • Attacks against a running server over HTTP:
    • forged Host and Origin headers;
    • hidden-tool probing;
    • oversized and deeply nested input;
    • error leakage;
    • metric inflation;
    • hostile input to the discovery tools.
  • Hostile input to every redaction pattern and to the URL checker (36 bypass forms).
  • Repository checks: secrets in the full git history, workflow permissions and triggers, and known vulnerabilities in every locked dependency (pip-audit, npm audit).

Findings and fixes

# Severity Finding Fix
1 High Denial of service through error redaction. Three redaction patterns took quadratic time. A tool that echoes an argument in an error message, which is a common pattern (No book with id '...'), let one unauthenticated request stall the whole server: 7 s for a 16 KB argument and about 2 minutes for 64 KB, the default limit. The patterns are now linear (200 KB in under 0.03 s). redact scans at most 8,192 characters, cut at whitespace, so no secret is left half visible.
2 Medium SSRF through IPv4 inside IPv6. check_url and safe_client accepted NAT64 addresses (64:ff9b::/96, 64:ff9b:1::/48) and IPv4-compatible addresses (::a.b.c.d) that carry a private IPv4 address, such as [64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe] for the metadata service. On a network with a NAT64 gateway these reach private hosts. The embedded IPv4 address must be public too, for NAT64, IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and Teredo forms.
3 Medium Unbounded metrics. Calls to made-up tool names each created a metric series, with no limit and no authentication needed: memory growth, and a cardinality explosion in Prometheus. Calls to unknown names are recorded as one (unknown tool) series in traces and metrics. The metrics sink keeps at most 2,000 series.
4 Medium In-memory store never shrank. MemoryStore removed an expired record only when the same key was read again, and had no size limit. Idempotency and single-use records therefore accumulated for ever. Expired records are swept on writes. The store keeps at most 100,000 records (max_entries) and drops the soonest-expiring first.
5 Low Approved continuation tokens were reusable. After an approval, a tool that asked a follow-up question issued a state token that carried the approval and could be presented again until it expired (15 minutes). Only the client could do this, not the model. The token is consumed on use, like the approval receipt.
6 Low Credentials in audit reports. ouncemcp audit https://user:pass@host/mcp?token=... wrote the full URL into the JSON, Markdown and HTML reports. Reports show the URL without credentials or query string.
7 Low Tag name pasted into a script in the release workflow. Only maintainers can push tags, and tags are protected, so this was hardening. The tag is passed as an argument.

Checked and found sound

  • Signed cursors and state:
    • HMAC-SHA256, compared in constant time;
    • bound to tool, caller, arguments and expiry;
    • canonical encoding;
    • key rotation supported.
  • Tenant isolation: handles and jobs are bound to caller and tenant, and caches are partitioned by principal, tenant and scopes.
  • Policies: hidden tools are indistinguishable from missing ones (unknown_tool), including through call_tool, and unauthenticated writes are refused.
  • Approvals:
    • asked before the handler runs;
    • a failing rule asks, so it fails closed;
    • receipts are single-use and bound to the arguments;
    • there is no argument a model can set to approve.
  • HTTP:
    • loopback by default;
    • a public bind is refused without allowed_hosts;
    • forged Host gets 421 and forged Origin gets 403, on /mcp and on the health routes.
  • Input limits:
    • 64 KB per call and 16 levels of nesting;
    • undeclared arguments are refused;
    • 8 calls in flight per caller.
  • Error handling: unexpected exceptions return a reference id only. A database password, a connection string and a file path in an exception did not reach the caller.
  • URL checker: refuses decimal, octal, hexadecimal and short IPv4 forms, mapped IPv6, userinfo and backslash tricks, metadata host names, and non-HTTP schemes.
  • safe_client: pins the connection to the checked address, re-checks redirects and ignores proxy variables.
  • HTML reports: data is escaped for a script context, and a hash-based Content-Security-Policy with default-src 'none' is set. The UI has no innerHTML and no dynamic links.
  • Repository:
    • no secrets in history (only the deliberate fake token in the redaction tests);
    • workflows use contents: read and SHA-pinned actions;
    • publishing goes through trusted publishing with no stored token.
  • Dependencies: no known vulnerabilities in any locked Python dependency.

Accepted risks and advice for operators

  • /metrics, /healthz and /readyz need no token. /metrics shows tool names and call counts. Expose these paths to your own network only (deploying).
  • A server without authentication has one caller. All anonymous clients share the anonymous principal: its concurrency limit, cursors and handles. Configure auth= for anything multi-user.
  • stdio trusts the local user unless stdio_policy="enforce".
  • The passthrough guard checks headers for the exact inbound token. It does not catch a token that is re-encoded or placed in a URL or body. It is a safety net, not a boundary.
  • Approvals trust the client. A client that answers approval requests without showing them to a person defeats them. That is inherent to MCP.
  • The report UI's dev-only shadcn CLI pulls in deepmerge, which has a low-severity advisory and no patched release. It is not in the shipped bundle.
  • PyPI trusted publisher: restrict it to the pypi environment, as PyPI recommends, and consider turning off "Allow administrators to bypass" on that environment.

Release

The fixes change no public signature except one addition: MemoryStore(max_entries=...). They ship in 1.0.0rc3.